Pregnant People? by Clarke, Jessica
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law 




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW FORUM 




In their article Unsexing Pregnancy, David Fontana and Naomi 
Schoenbaum undertake the important project of disentangling the social 
aspects of pregnancy from those that relate to a pregnant woman’s body. 
They argue that the law should stop treating the types of work either 
parent can do—such as purchasing a carseat, finding a pediatrician, 
or choosing a daycare—as exclusively the domain of the pregnant wom-
an. The project’s primary aim is to undermine legal rules that assume a 
gendered division of labor in which men are breadwinners and women 
are caretakers. But Fontana and Schoenbaum argue their project will 
also have benefits in terms of equality for expectant LGBTQ parents. To 
further this project, this Response asks what unsexing pregnancy might 
look like for different types of pregnant people: (1) pregnant individuals 
who do not identify as women, (2) expectant couples in which one 
partner is pregnant, (3) expectant parents engaging a surrogate or pur-
suing adoption, and (4) pregnant people who rely on networks of family 
and friends for support and caregiving. It argues that, in each of these 
contexts, the extension of pregnancy benefits raises a unique set of ques-
tions. But across all of these contexts, it will take more than simply 
making existing pregnancy rules gender neutral to achieve equality. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Unsexing Pregnancy, David Fontana and Naomi Schoenbaum make 
a compelling case against laws premised on the assumption that the 
caregiving tasks associated with pregnancy should be assigned exclusively 
to the pregnant woman.1 They argue that pregnancy requires labor in 
addition to that entailed in childbirth, gestation, and related changes to 
the pregnant body. Pregnancy also entails forms of labor that are 
relational, social, and economic, such as arranging doctor’s appoint-
ments, researching the options for giving birth, and preparing financially 
and emotionally for the arrival of the child.2 
                                                                                                                           
 *  Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Neha Jain and Jennifer 
Bennett Shinall for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this Response. 
 1. David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 
309 (2019). 
 2. See id. at 326–32. 
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Unsexing Pregnancy makes a meaningful contribution to scholarship 
on workplace accommodations for pregnancy3 by offering an important 
and useful distinction between carework that is “tied to the physical fact 
of gestation” and carework that is not.4 Laws governing family leave and 
health insurance recognize, at least superficially, that mothers are not the 
only people with caregiving responsibilities after a child is born. But the 
law often takes for granted that only prospective mothers engage in 
carework during pregnancy. Unsexing Pregnancy explains how the assump-
tion that women are solely responsible for pregnancy is significant, in 
that divisions of labor that begin during pregnancy are likely to persist. 
As scholarship on the allocation of administrative tasks in households has 
demonstrated, initial assignments of tasks often turn out to be “sticky,”5 
so women tasked with caregiving responsibilities during pregnancy are 
likely to retain those responsibilities after the child’s birth. These sticky 
assignments reinforce the gendered division of labor in which men are 
the presumptive breadwinners and women the presumptive caretakers. 
The article therefore argues for heightened constitutional scrutiny 
of laws that classify by sex during pregnancy.6 In a line of equal 
protection cases beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court struck down 
laws that distinguished between the sexes in ways that reflected and 
reinforced stereotypes about men’s roles as providers and women’s roles 
as caretakers.7 Prospective fathers might use this line of cases to 
challenge workplace accommodation rules that only provide benefits to 
pregnant women based on the assumption that women should do all the 
                                                                                                                           
 3. In accord with Fontana and Schoenbaum’s article, this Response will pertain 
primarily to those rules that require workplace accommodations for pregnancy: the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), those provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) pertaining to insurance coverage for pregnancy, and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Health care 
is a workplace issue because of the number of Americans with employer-sponsored health 
insurance. 
This Response will not ask what unsexing pregnancy might look like with respect to 
Medicaid or other forms of public assistance, although it is important to note that the 
project of extending those benefits beyond pregnant women might have troubling impli-
cations. See, e.g., Khiara Bridges, The Poverty of Privacy Rights 5, 34 (2017) (explaining 
how state Medicaid programs subject pregnant women seeking prenatal care “to invasions 
of privacy that we might understand as demonstrations of the danger of government pow-
er without limits,” but noting that the author’s ethnographic research did not extend to 
fathers). 
While Unsexing Pregnancy discusses equal protection cases related to family, criminal, 
and immigration law, it does not develop the impact that its argument might have on 
these doctrines, so I will leave consideration of those issues for another day. 
 4. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 313. 
 5. Id; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 Geo. L.J. 1409, 1414 (2015) 
(“Moreover, admin produces distributional inequities not only for women, but also for 
people of many stripes; because admin is ‘sticky,’ it tends to stay where it lands.”). 
 6. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 314, 354. 
 7. See id. at 318–20. 
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work to prepare for the birth of a child.8 The result would be invalidation 
of laws that are not “substantially related” to physical differences between 
expectant mothers and fathers.9 For example, the authors argue that a 
law covering smoking cessation programs only for pregnant women 
would be invalid. Even though maternal smoking may be uniquely harm-
ful to a fetus, “[s]ome studies show that paternal smoking has a substan-
tial fetal impact.”10 The remedy would be to allow all expectant parents to 
take advantage of smoking cessation programs.11 By contrast, there’s no 
reason someone who is not pregnant would need “[a] back support 
pillow designed for pregnancy.”12 So a law that provides only pregnant 
individuals with insurance coverage to purchase such a pillow would be 
valid.13 
Unsexing Pregnancy contributes to conversations about the gendered 
distribution of parental responsibilities by elucidating how that distribu-
tion begins during pregnancy.14 The article’s project is to remake 
                                                                                                                           
 8. While the Supreme Court held in 1974 that sex discrimination is distinct from 
pregnancy discrimination for purposes of equal protection analysis, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484 (1974), Fontana and Schoenbaum argue that Geduldig “should be read not to 
mean that pregnancy discrimination cannot be sex discrimination but that pregnancy 
discrimination constitutes sex discrimination only when founded on sex stereotypes.” 
Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 355. 
 9. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 355 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996)). Under the Supreme Court’s sex equality jurisprudence, this is a 
strict test: “In practice, sex must serve as a ‘perfect proxy’ for the law’s objective.” Id. at 
359 (quoting Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional 
Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1449 
(2000)). 
 10. Id. at 361. 
 11. The remedy for sex discrimination could be “leveling up,” in other words, 
providing prospective fathers with the same higher level of protection as mothers, or 
“leveling down” and stripping pregnant workers of the extra protection. See id. at 362. 
Fontana and Schoenbaum generally advocate leveling up, because leveling down to elimi-
nate pregnancy benefits altogether would disparately harm women’s workplace opportuni-
ties. Id. at 362–63. But see id. at 362 & n.321 (recognizing that the Supreme Court has 
held that whether to level up or down is to be determined based on the “legislature’s 
intent” (quoting Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1699 (2017)). 
 12. Id. at 360. 
 13. Id. 
 14. The primary objection the authors identify to their proposal is that it may invite 
intrusive participation by fathers in pregnancy, at the risk of the mother’s bodily 
autonomy. Id. at 363–68. But the authors argue that courts can distinguish rules extending 
prenatal benefits from those that would require pregnant women to involve prospective 
fathers in their decisionmaking. Id. at 364. In contexts in which paternal involvement 
implicates a mother’s bodily autonomy—such as the one-night stand who wants to attend 
an ultrasound appointment—health care privacy laws require the pregnant patient’s 
consent. Id. at 364 & n.331. The authors acknowledge that extending prenatal benefits to 
fathers could change the relationship dynamics within couples, giving fathers more lever-
age in disputes about the pregnancy. Id. at 365. But they argue that, on balance, extending 
pregnancy benefits would empower women because it would allow their partners to take 
on a larger share of the carework. Id. at 365–67. 
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workplace accommodation law so that it does not reflect or reinforce a 
traditional breadwinner–caretaker family structure. The article’s para-
digm family—in other words, the family it imagines at the center of this 
project—is one anchored by a man and a woman who are both in the 
workforce and are expecting the birth of their first child.15 Its normative 
vision is a feminist one that seeks to undo legal rules and social structures 
that dictate particular gender roles for each member of that couple. 
While the article is conscientious in discussing the implications of each of 
its arguments for prospective LGBTQ parents, those implications are not 
its primary focus.16 
This Response asks what unsexing pregnancy might mean for 
families beyond the article’s paradigm example. It pushes the argument 
from Unsexing Pregnancy further by untangling four ways in which the law 
might unsex pregnancy: (1) for individuals; (2) for couples; (3) for sur-
rogacy and adoption arrangements; and (4) for networked pregnancies,17 
in which a pregnant person relies on extended family, social circles, or 
public assistance rather than a partner. The aim of this Response is not to 
propose new legal rules; rather, it is to raise questions about how 
unsexing pregnancy might be a different project in the context of these 
different family forms. Normative considerations other than gender 
equity are at stake when pregnancy is unsexed in various contexts, includ-
ing equality based on sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, 
family form, race, and class. One theme that is apparent across these 
contexts is that social change will require more than simply redrafting 
the rules in sex-neutral terms; it will require affirmative efforts at equality 
and inclusion for all pregnant people.18 
I. PREGNANT PERSONS? 
One way that the law might “unsex pregnancy” is for individuals: 
The law could see pregnancy not only as something that happens to 
women’s bodies, but also as a bodily condition experienced by people 
who do not identify as women. Unsexing Pregnancy notes at the outset that 
transgender men may become pregnant.19 It points out that courts and 
                                                                                                                           
 15. See id. at 313–14. 
 16. Id. at 313 (describing how the article “emphasizes the interlocking sex 
stereotypes of women’s and men’s respective roles in the family and at work that fuel 
gendered distributions of caregiving,” and “in doing so . . . also highlights the damaging 
consequences of the sexed pregnancy for other family configurations”). 
 17. Cf. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding 
of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 Va. L. Rev. 385, 388 (2008) (discussing how “families rely 
on networks of nonparental caregivers in order to provide care”). 
 18. Cf. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 
35 Harv. J.L. & Gender 57, 112–13 (2012) (distinguishing between laws that would unsex 
parenting in a “thin” and formal way from those that would do so in a “thick” and 
substantive way). 
 19. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 311 n.4. 
2019] PREGNANT PEOPLE? 177 
 
employers might interpret statutes that provide benefits only to “ex-
pectant mothers” in an overly literal way, refusing to grant accommoda-
tions to pregnant men who have changed their birth certificate sex 
designations to male.20 Even if employers and courts are not so literal in 
their interpretations, transgender men are placed in the difficult position 
of having to make the inauthentic claim that they are “mothers” in order 
to receive benefits.21 Thus, unsexing pregnancy would have benefits for 
pregnant transgender men. 
Unsexing pregnancy for individuals is an urgent project for 
pregnant people who are not women and need access to reproductive 
health care. This includes not just transgender men but also pregnant 
people with intersex variations and who identify outside the gender 
binary. And while extending existing pregnancy benefits to all pregnant 
individuals—regardless of the sex designations on their identification 
documents or their gender identities—would be a step forward, mean-
ingful change requires more comprehensive efforts to ensure all preg-
nant people receive appropriate and affirming health care. 
The idea of unsexing pregnancy may have benefits for any number 
of pregnant individuals who, for various reasons, do not fall into the 
category of “expectant mothers.” To understand who might fall into this 
group, it may be useful to consider the distinction drawn by LGBTQ 
rights advocates between “sex” and “gender identity.”22 “Sex” often refers 
to the male or female designation ascribed to an infant at birth, or “a 
combination of bodily characteristics including: chromosomes, hor-
mones, internal and external reproductive organs, and secondary sex 
characteristics.”23 By contrast, “gender identity” is “[a] person’s internal, 
deeply held sense of their gender,” as, for example, a man or a woman.24 
Sex and gender identity do not always correspond in conventional ways: 
“Transgender” is a term for a person whose gender identity does not 
match the one commonly associated with the sex assigned to them at 
birth.25 
                                                                                                                           
 20. Id. at 338. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., GLAAD, GLAAD Media Reference Guide 10 (10th ed. 2016), http:// 
www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/GLAAD-Media-Reference-Guide-Tenth-Edition.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2CL7-2HVM]. By offering these categories, I do not mean to posit any 
universal or necessary distinction, or to suggest that these categories are relevant to any 
other particular legal controversies. See Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 
Harv. L. Rev. 894, 905–10 (2019) (arguing that debates over the objectively correct defini-
tions of sex, gender, and related concepts obscure the normative and political stakes of 
particular legal controversies). 
 23. GLAAD, supra note 22, at 10. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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Neither sex nor gender identity are binary. Between 0.05 and 1.7% 
of infants have intersex variations:26 “any of a range of sex characteristics 
that may not fit a doctor’s notions of binary ‘male’ or ‘female’ bodies.”27 
With respect to gender identity, in the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, the 
largest survey of transgender individuals to date, approximately one-third 
of respondents identified as “nonbinary” rather than as transgender men 
or transgender women.28 Nonbinary is a term for a person who does not 
exclusively identify as a man or a woman.29 Nonbinary people have a 
diverse array of gender identities, such as genderqueer, agender, or 
genderfluid.30 They may use pronouns such as the singular “they” rather 
than “he” or “she.”31 While it is difficult to estimate the total number of 
nonbinary people,32 a 2018 survey found that thirty-five percent of 
people ages thirteen to twenty-one know a person who uses nonbinary 
pronouns.33 
Unsexing pregnancy could work by highlighting intersex variation: 
how some pregnant people may have chromosomes, hormones, or anat-
omy that do not all meet medical definitions of “female.”34 A tautological 
                                                                                                                           
 26. Fact Sheet: Intersex, United Nations Free & Equal (May 2017), https://unfe.org/ 
system/unfe-65-Intersex_Factsheet_ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8YR-97MS] (“[T]he 
upper estimate is similar to the number of red haired people.”). Some of these variations 
may not be visible at birth, while others become visible at puberty, and others are chromo-
somal variations that never become visible. Id. 
 27. Intersex Definitions, InterACT, https://interactadvocates.org/intersex-definitions/ 
[perma.cc/G5VK-MPXJ] (last visited Sept. 7, 2019); see also Katrina Karkazis, Rebecca 
Jordan-Young, Georgiann Davis & Silvia Campores, Out of Bounds? A Critique of the New 
Policies on Hyperandrogenism in Elite Female Athletes, Am. J. Bioethics, July 2012, at 3, 
5–6 (“Sex is commonly thought to be straightforward, consisting of two clear categories of 
male and female. Yet there are at least six markers of sex—including chromosomes, 
gonads, hormones, secondary sex characteristics, external genitalia, and internal 
genitalia—and none of these are binary.”). 
 28. Sandy E. James, Jody L. Herman, Susan Rankin, Mara Keisling, Lisa Mottet & 
Ma’ayan Anafi, Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender Equal., The Report of the 2015 U.S. 
Transgender Survey 18, 45 (2016), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs 
/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/7UQQ-GVLD]. 
 29. GLAAD, supra note 22, at 11. 
 30. See Clarke, supra note 22, at 905–10. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. at 899 & n.21 (estimating half a million people, roughly the population of 
Miami, identify as nonbinary, but noting that the figure may not reflect the growing 
number of people who do not identify exclusively as men or women). 
 33. Kim Parker, Nikki Graf & Ruth Igielnik, Generation Z Looks a Lot Like 
Millennials on Key Social and Political Issues, Pew Research Ctr. (Jan. 17, 2019), http:// 
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/01/17/generation-z-looks-a-lot-like-millennials-on-key-
social-and-political-issues/ [https://perma.cc/CZZ8-YA5D]. 
 34. See, e.g., Samantha A. Schoenhaus, Scott E. Lentz, Peter Saber, Malcom G. 
Munro & Seth Kivnick, Pregnancy in a Hermaphrodite with a Male-Predominant Mosaic 
Karyotype, 90 Fertility & Sterility 2016.e7, 2016.e7–e9 (2008) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (discussing cases of pregnancy in individuals who had various traits, such as Y 
chromosomes or testicular tissue, that the physicians categorized as “male-predominant 
mosaic karyotype”). 
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argument could be made that all people who are pregnant are “female,” 
because the definition of “female” is having those sex characteristics that 
enable a person to become pregnant. But this is not the only medical 
definition of “female.”35 Unsexing pregnancy might mean recognizing 
that some people who are pregnant may have intersex variations.36 It 
might mean adopting “intersex-affirming” health care practices that pro-
tect patients with intersex variations from the unnecessary examinations, 
violations of privacy, discrimination, and harassment they sometimes 
experience when seeking reproductive health care.37 
Alternatively, unsexing pregnancy could work by delinking gender 
identity from pregnancy, recognizing that not just women, but also 
transgender men and nonbinary people, become pregnant. While some 
transgender men and nonbinary people may seek surgical treatments 
that leave them incapable of pregnancy, not all do. In the 2015 U.S. 
Transgender Survey, only fourteen percent of transgender men and two 
percent of nonbinary individuals reported having had a hysterectomy.38 
Media coverage characterizes the “pregnant man” as a rare phenome-
non, but a number of indicators suggest pregnant transgender men are 
not so unusual.39 It is possible that fewer transgender men became 
pregnant in the past because many jurisdictions required surgeries, 
                                                                                                                           
 35. See, e.g., Karkazis et al., supra note 27, at 5–6 (“There are many biological 
markers of sex but none is decisive: that is, none is actually present in all people labeled 
male or female.”); Schoenhaus et al., supra note 34, at 2016.e9 tbl.1 (discussing a case of 
“[p]regnancy in a woman with a Y chromosome”). 
 36. See, e.g., Hida Viloria, Born Both: An Intersex Life 10 (2017) (discussing the 
author’s experience with pregnancy). 
 37. InterACT & Lambda Legal, Providing Ethical and Compassionate Health Care to 
Intersex Patients 8–9, 22–24 (2018), https://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/downloads/resource_20180731_hospital-policies-intersex.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
U4AP-69VC]. 
 38. James et al., supra note 28, at 101 figs.7.12 & 7.13. The survey also reports that 
twenty-nine percent of transgender men and sixty-eight percent of nonbinary people did 
not wish to have the procedure or were unsure if they ever wished to. Id. There are a 
number of reasons transgender people do not pursue surgery, including that some are 
unable to afford it or to take the requisite time off from work, school, or caregiving obliga-
tions; some desire to maintain the capacity to reproduce; and for some, surgery is not 
necessary to treat gender dysphoria or affirm their gender identity. See, e.g., Lisa Mottet, 
Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Markers 
on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of 
Transgender People, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. 373, 407–09 (2013). 
 39. See Alexis D. Light, Juno Obedin-Maliver, Jae M. Sevelius & Jennifer L. Kerns, 
Transgender Men Who Experienced Pregnancy After Female-to-Male Gender 
Transitioning, 124 Obstetrics & Gynecology 1120, 1120 (2014) (reporting on the results of 
a study conducted in 2013 surveying forty-one transgender men who had experienced 
pregnancy); Juno Obedin-Maliver & Harvey J. Makadon, Transgender Men and 
Pregnancy, 9 Obstetric Med. 4, 4 (2016) (“[N]ews reports, documentaries, social media 
list-serves and video-sharing sites, guidebooks, fact sheets, and . . . lists of health service 
provider[s] with experience supporting transgender individuals in pregnancy and birth, 
suggest numbers of transgender individuals . . . seeking family planning, fertility, and 
pregnancy services could certainly be quite large.”). 
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which often resulted in sterilization, as a condition of legal recognition.40 
States are now moving away from surgical requirements as prerequisites 
to changing the gender marker on identification documents.41 In addi-
tion to transgender men, nonbinary individuals are increasingly report-
ing on their experiences being pregnant.42 Pregnancies among people 
who are not women may increase as more people transition at younger 
ages and transgender and nonbinary identities become more socially 
understood.43 
Policymakers, legal reformers, health care providers, and employers 
who seek to be more inclusive of transgender, nonbinary, and intersex 
identities and variations ought to take seriously the idea of formally 
disentangling binary concepts of “sex” and “gender identity” from 
pregnancy. As ACLU lawyer Chase Strangio has argued, the simplistic 
assumption that cisgender44 women are the only people who can become 
pregnant is “literally killing trans people.”45 For example, transgender 
men may not have access to proper obstetric or gynecological care due to 
discrimination by health care providers46 and bureaucratic barriers, such 
as insurance companies that deny coverage for gynecological care if a 
                                                                                                                           
 40. See, e.g., Mottet, supra note 38, at 406, 424 & n.206. 
 41. For information on the laws of every state, see ID Documents Center, Nat’l Ctr. 
for Transgender Equal., https://transequality.org/documents [https://perma.cc/BJQ3-
4CRV] (last updated July 2019). 
 42. See, e.g., Jesi Taylor Cruz, Finding Community During Pregnancy as a Black Non-
Binary Femme, The Establishment (Feb. 4, 2019), https://theestablishment.co/finding-
community-during-pregnancy-as-a-black-non-binary-femme/ [https://perma.cc/F83T-R38N]; 
Rory Mickelson, I’m Pregnant, but I’m Not a Woman, Advocate (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2018/11/13/im-pregnant-im-not-woman [https:// 
perma.cc/NR7R-B4TL]; s.e. smith, For Nonbinary Parents, Giving Birth Can Be Especially 
Fraught, Rewire.News (Jan. 25, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/01/25/nonbinary- 
parents-giving-birth-can-especially-fraught/ [https://perma.cc/4FC5-UK4L]; cf. A Womb 
of Their Own (Serious Play Films 2016) (documenting the experiences of six masculine-
identified pregnant people). 
 43. Cf. Alexis Hoffkling, Juno Obedin-Maliver & Jae Sevelius, From Erasure to 
Opportunity: A Qualitative Study of the Experiences of Transgender Men Around 
Pregnancy and Recommendations for Providers, BMC Pregnancy & Childbirth, Nov. 2017, 
at 7, 18 (speculating that the perception of an increasing number of pregnant transgender 
men “likely represents a true shift, perhaps driven by cultural changes making non-binary 
transition more legible, increasing legibility of being pregnant and male, and possibly by 
increasing numbers of people transitioning younger in life”). 
 44. “Cisgender” is a term that means a person whose gender identity matches the 
one commonly associated with the sex assigned to them at birth. 
 45. Chase Strangio, Can Reproductive Trans Bodies Exist?, 19 CUNY L. Rev. 223, 241 
(2016). 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 242 (discussing data that “confirm[] that transgender people 
experience extreme discrimination in health care settings causing them to delay or avoid 
receiving care”); Cécile A. Unger, Care of the Transgender Patient: A Survey of 
Gynecologists’ Current Knowledge and Practice, 24 J. Women’s Health 114, 116 (2015) 
(“[I]ssues of gender identity remain either misunderstood or not well understood by 
physicians.”). 
2019] PREGNANT PEOPLE? 181 
 
patient’s sex is coded as “male” in their records.47 Failure to receive 
gynecological care such as routine Pap smears leaves transgender men 
and nonbinary people at higher risk of death from conditions such as 
cervical cancer.48 In one case, a transgender man whose boyfriend 
brought him to an emergency room due to abdominal pain was triaged 
as “nonurgent” because a nurse failed to take the possibility of preg-
nancy seriously, despite being informed the patient was a transgender 
man who had received a positive result on a home pregnancy test.49 After 
several hours of delay, a physician realized the man’s condition was 
urgent and he needed an “emergency caesarian delivery.”50 The baby was 
stillborn.51 Even though the patient “had not planned or expected the 
pregnancy, he was heartbroken at the loss of his baby and had a major 
depressive episode.”52 
Pregnancy can present unique challenges for transgender people 
because of “anti-transgender stigma, strongly gendered norms around 
pregnancy, institutional structures that do not recognize the possibility of 
a transgender man becoming pregnant, and lack of research and 
available information for providers or patients.”53 Transgender men have 
a range of experiences during pregnancy.54 For some, pregnancy can 
trigger gender dysphoria55 as they are forced to confront social attitudes 
and expectations about pregnancy as a woman’s experience.56 One man 
said about his pregnancy: “I looked at it as something to endure to have 
                                                                                                                           
 47. Hoffkling et al., supra note 43, at 13 (finding that men who need gynecological 
or obstetric care “often faced challenges with booking or billing for those services, because 
of how computer and filing systems were managed”); Strangio, supra note 45, at 242. 
 48. In the U.S. Transgender Survey, only twenty-seven percent of transgender re-
spondents who were assigned female at birth reported having Pap smears in the past year, 
compared with forty-three percent of the general population. James et al., supra note 28, 
at 102. In one survey of generalist OBGYNs, approximately eleven percent of respondents 
stated they refused to perform Pap smears on transgender men. Unger, supra note 46, at 
114. 
 49. Daphna Stroumsa, Elizabeth F.S. Roberts, Hadrian Kinnear & Lisa Harris, The 
Power and Limits of Classification—A 32-Year-Old Man with Abdominal Pain, 380 New 
Eng. J. Med. 1885, 1885, 1887 (2019) (“Having no clear classificatory framework for 
making sense of a patient like Sam, the nurse deployed implicit assumptions about who 
can be pregnant, attributed his high blood pressure to untreated chronic hypertension, 
and classified his case as nonurgent.”). 
 50. Id. at 1886. 
 51. Id. The researchers concluded that the patient would have received an earlier 
evaluation if he had been a cisgender woman, and “[e]arlier evaluation might have 
resulted in detection of the cord prolapse in time to prevent fetal death.” Id. at 1887. 
 52. Id. at 1888. 
 53. Hoffkling et al., supra note 43, at 8. 
 54. Id. 
 55. “Gender dysphoria” is a form of “clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning” experienced by some 
transgender people. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders 451–53 (5th ed. 2013). 
 56. See smith, supra note 42. 
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a child.”57 One qualitative study concluded that “[l]oneliness was the 
overarching theme.”58 In another study, a pregnant man said he felt 
isolated because of the sense that he “was the only one.”59 Another went 
so far as to avoid leaving his home because he was “fearful that out on 
the street, the sight of a pregnant man would invite trouble.”60 Some 
research suggests transgender men face a high risk of postpartum depres-
sion.61 Transgender men may also face challenges in deciding how to 
sequence their “surgical, medical, and social transitions relative to 
pregnancy.”62 
Health care and pregnancy services providers often lack competency 
in providing care for pregnant people who are not women.63 Pregnant 
transgender patients may face exclusion; for example, one transgender 
man reported that he was denied lactation coaching.64 They may be har-
assed; one man reported that health care providers told him that “Child 
Protection Services was alerted to the fact a ‘tranny’ had a baby.”65 Like 
some patients with intersex variations,66 transgender patients report receiv-
                                                                                                                           
 57. Light et al., supra note 39, at 1123 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58. Simon Adriane Ellis, Danuta M. Wojnar & Maria Pettinato, Conception, 
Pregnancy, and Birth Experiences of Male and Gender Variant Gestational Parents: It’s 
How We Could Have a Family, 60 J. Midwifery & Women’s Health 62, 63 (2014). 
 59. Light et al., supra note 39, at 1123 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Denise Grady, A Family in Transition, N.Y. Times (June 16, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/health/transgender-baby.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
 61. See Light et al., supra note 39, at 1126. 
 62. Hoffkling et al., supra note 43, at 15. Some report the need for “[h]onest advice 
on fertility options” and some report that they “felt misled” with respect to the “effects of 
testosterone—wrongly believing it is an effective contraceptive, or necessarily causes 
infertility.” Sally Hines, Ruth Pearce, Carla Pfeffer, Damien Riggs, Elisabetta Ruspini & 
Francis Ray White, Trans Pregnancy: Implications for Policy and Practice, Univ. of Leeds, 
https://transpregnancy.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/70/2018/11/Trans-Pregnancy- 
poster.jpg [https://perma.cc/8FL7-DV2V] (last visited July 30, 2019) (presenting initial 
findings of the Trans Pregnancy research project, based on semistructured qualitative in-
terviews of fifty trans men and nonbinary people who were assigned female at birth); see 
also Julie Compton, Trans Dads Tell Doctors: ‘You Can Be a Man and Have a Baby,’ NBC 
News (May 19, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/trans-dads-tell-doctors-
you-can-be-man-have-baby-n1006906 [https:/perma.cc/SM2W-JY7N] (last updated May 20, 
2019) (reporting on examples of “misinformation and discouragement transgender men 
say they face from the medical establishment when they decide to get pregnant—a prob-
lem advocates and experts blame on a lack of training and research around transgender 
health care, as well as doctors’ biases”). 
 63. Hoffkling et al., supra note 43, at 12–13. 
 64. Id. at 12. 
 65. Light et al., supra note 39, at 1124 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a 
survey participant); see also Hoffkling et al., supra note 43, at 17 (“Participants were 
misgendered, laughed at, and told they could not make good parents.”). 
 66. See InterACT & Lambda Legal, supra note 37, at 8–9, 22–24 (“Historically 
common, the unnecessary examination and exhibition of intersex people’s bodies as 
medical ‘curiosities’ has been described as deeply shaming and traumatizing by intersex 
individuals for decades.”). 
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ing “seemingly unnecessary physical exams—especially pelvic exams.”67 
Or they may be ignored. One transgender man reported that “many 
OB/GYN spaces ‘feel like they only cater to women giving birth . . . and 
that made me feel alienated.’”68 A woman who attended birthing classes 
with her pregnant nonbinary spouse described her discomfort with the 
“constant use of ‘mamas,’ ‘moms,’ and ‘ladies’ to refer to the pregnant 
people in the room.”69 She explained: “My partner’s the one giving birth, 
but I’m the one who will go by ‘Mom’ when our kid is born.”70 
As a result of mistreatment, some transgender men and nonbinary 
people avoid obstetric care or fail to disclose relevant information to 
medical professionals.71 Those who can afford to may seek out midwives 
or doulas who market themselves as “trans-friendly.”72 One nonbinary 
person, Zoë Williams, “chose a home birth, in part to have access to care 
providers they could educate about their needs.”73 While pregnant 
individuals have the right to make medically informed decisions about 
where to give birth, there is some evidence that home births are associ-
ated with increased risks of infant deaths and seizures.74 Discrimination 
should be eliminated so that it does not dictate this decision. Other 
transgender men and nonbinary people choose hospital births and keep 
their gender identities a secret from providers. For example, Peregrin 
Winkle, one nonbinary person, “said they ‘gritted [their] teeth and dealt 
with the misgendering silently’” during a hospital birth.75 “Race, class, 
and geography” can further complicate whether nonbinary people can 
find gender-affirming obstetric care.76 
As Fontana and Schoenbaum argue, laws, rules, and policies can be 
revised to change references to “wom[e]n affected by pregnancy” or 
                                                                                                                           
 67. Hoffkling et al., supra note 43, at 12. 
 68. Id. at 13. 
 69. Tori Truscheit, All the Things I Worry About as My Nonbinary Partner Prepares 
to Give Birth, The Cut (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/12/giving-birth-
outside-the-gender-binary.html [https://perma.cc/8L83-4DF3]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Hoffkling et al., supra note 43, at 8 (“Within healthcare settings, stigma leads to 
inadequate information on the part of providers, as well as individual mistreatment of 
patients. These, in turn, can lead transgender men to avoid seeking care or avoid 
disclosing medically relevant information.” (footnotes omitted)); smith, supra note 42 
(discussing how pregnant nonbinary individuals may sometimes avoid hospitals). 
 72. See smith, supra note 42. 
 73. Id; see also Light et al., supra note 39, at 1126 (reporting that transgender men 
surveyed about pregnancy “used nonphysician providers and nonhospital birth locations 
more frequently than the general public”). 
 74. See The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Obstetric Practice, 
Committee Opinion Number 697, at 1 (2017), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee- 
Opinions/Committee-on-Obstetric-Practice/co697.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBN9-PNTY] 
(noting that planned home birth is associated with a “twofold increased risk of perinatal 
death . . . and a threefold increased risk of neonatal seizures”). 
 75. smith, supra note 42. 
 76. Id. 
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“expectant mother[s]” to sex-neutral terms for pregnant individuals.77 
Semantic changes would have expressive value in making clear that all 
pregnant people deserve inclusion. These changes would avoid unneces-
sary arguments about, for example, whether a pregnant father or non-
binary parent qualifies for benefits reserved for “pregnant mothers.” 
Moreover, extending benefits to all pregnant individuals does not impli-
cate the autonomy of the pregnant person in the way that extending the 
concept of pregnancy to a partner who is not gestating a child might.78 
There are potential downsides to this form of gender neutrality. One 
potential downside is that it might require some unconventional gram-
mar. Policies that refer to “she” or “her” might need creative revisions. 
But such grammatical challenges are not insurmountable. The proposed 
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act avoids gendered references by referring 
to “workers,” “employees,” or “applicants,” rather than mothers.79 More 
importantly, rules of grammar should not trump considerations of 
inclusion.80 
A second potential downside is that this move might throw a wrench 
in the formalistic legal argument that protection against pregnancy dis-
crimination is required to ensure equality for the class of “women,” 
because “only women can become pregnant.”81 But as Fontana and 
Schoenbaum argue, the Supreme Court has rejected the formalistic 
equation of women with pregnancy, while leaving the door open to the 
argument that rules that classify based on pregnancy might be 
constitutionally suspect if they are pretexts for sex discrimination.82 
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the formalistic legal argument is 
not doing the persuasive work in debates over pregnancy discrimina-
tion.83 Additionally, the formalistic argument has risks for feminists: “If 
the law defines women as a class by their capacity to become pregnant, 
                                                                                                                           
 77. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(first quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012); then quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(4) 
(2018)); see also Clarke, supra note 22, at 954–55 (advocating that rules related to 
pregnancy be decoupled from gender identity). 
 78. See supra note 14 (discussing this objection to Fontana and Schoenbaum’s 
proposal). 
 79. Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 2417, 115th Cong. §§ 2, 7 (2017). 
 80. See, e.g., Robin Dembroff & Daniel Wodak, The Problem with Pronouns, 
Philosopher: Featured Philosophers (June 23, 2017), https://politicalphilosopher.net/ 
2017/06/23/featured-philosophers-robin-dembroff-daniel-wodak/ [https://perma.cc/4PN6- 
NEUU] (“[A] moral should clearly defeats any grammatical should.”). 
 81. See Strangio, supra note 45, at 229–31 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 
496 n.20 (1974) in its discussion of this argument). 
 82. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 314 & n.14 (discussing Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) and Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484). 
 83. Clarke, supra note 22, at 955–56. Formalistic arguments are less persuasive than 
“more substantive arguments linking pregnancy discrimination to sex: for example, that in 
practice, discrimination based on pregnancy drives women’s inequality, that it is based on 
the assumption that all workers meet a traditionally male norm, or that it is a thinly veiled 
attempt to exclude women from the workplace.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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then this capacity appears to be a legitimate basis for discrimination 
against women.”84 
Making pregnancy benefits gender neutral is a starting point for 
transgender and nonbinary patients and those with intersex variations. 
But it will not “unsex” pregnancy for these individuals in a meaningful 
way. Broader strategies for change are required to ensure that all preg-
nant people receive appropriate medical care and experience pregnancy 
without harassment or discrimination.85 Courts should interpret existing 
prohibitions on sex discrimination in health care to forbid discrimina-
tion against transgender patients,86 and legislatures should act to correct 
those courts that fail to do so.87 Sterilizing surgeries should never be a 
precondition for changing the sex or gender designations on official 
identity documents and records.88 Health care providers should ensure 
that medical records include information related to sex assigned at birth 
and gender identity, allow changes to information on gender identity 
without friction, and maintain patient privacy.89 Training, research, edu-
cation, and institutional commitments are required to eliminate dis-
crimination, harassment, and neglect—ensuring that all pregnant people 
                                                                                                                           
 84. Id. at 956 (citing Cary Franklin, Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict over 
“Inherent Differences” Between the Sexes, 2017 Sup. Ct. Rev. 169, 180 (2017)). 
 85. See generally InterACT & Lambda Legal, supra note 37 (making recommenda-
tions with respect to care for patients with intersex variations); Nat’l LGBT Health Educ. 
Ctr., Providing Affirmative Care for Patients with Non-Binary Gender Identities 9, 12–13 
(2017), https://www.lgbthealtheducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Providing-
Affirmative-Care-for-People-with-Non-Binary-Gender-Identities.pdf [https://perma.cc/4P3K- 
V2FQ] (explaining why “cultural competency around non-binary gender identities” is es-
sential to improve health outcomes and sharing best practices for providing care to non-
binary people). 
 86. See Clarke, supra note 22, at 987–90 (discussing controversies over whether 
discrimination against transgender patients violates the nondiscrimination provisions of 
the Affordable Care Act). At the time of this writing, the Trump Administration has pro-
posed a rollback of regulations interpreting the ACA to require nondiscrimination on the 
basis of gender identity. See Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs 
or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. 27,846, 27,847, 27,857 (proposed June 14, 2019) (to be codified 
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) (proposing to “repeal the definition of ‘on the basis of sex’” that 
prevents discrimination based on gender identity). A case regarding whether discrimina-
tion against a transgender employee is a type of “sex” discrimination prohibited by federal 
law is also pending before the Supreme Court. EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019). 
 87. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1365.5(e) (2019) (clarifying that prohib-
ited health care discrimination on the basis of “sex” includes gender identity and gender 
expression). The Equality Act, a bill passed by the House in 2019, would forbid discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex and gender identity in health care nationwide. Equality Act, H.R. 
5, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 88. See Mottet, supra note 38, at 406 (quoting Press Release, World Prof’l Ass’n for 
Transgender Health, Identity Recognition Statement (June 16, 2010) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review)). 
 89. See Nat’l LGBT Health Educ. Ctr., supra note 85, at 7; Obedin-Maliver & 
Makadon, supra note 39, at 6–7; Stroumsa et al., supra note 49, at 1887–88. 
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receive care that affirms their gender identities and is grounded in “com-
passion and respect.”90 
II. PREGNANT COUPLES? 
Fontana and Schoenbaum’s article focuses on unsexing pregnancy 
not for individuals but for couples—two expectant parents, generally a 
mother and a father—in which the mother does a disproportionate share 
of the work of preparing for the baby’s arrival. The examples of unfair 
treatment of pregnant and nonpregnant parents in Unsexing Pregnancy 
are of two types: medical conditions and family responsibilities. By “medi-
cal conditions,” I mean the law’s failure to recognize the health impacts 
of pregnancy on the nonpregnant parent. By “family responsibilities,” I 
mean the law’s failure to recognize that much of the carework that goes 
into planning for the arrival of a child can be done by the nonpregnant 
parent. The extension of workplace accommodation law in the medical 
and family contexts raises different questions. With respect to medical 
conditions, the question is whether the unfairness lies in excluding 
fathers, or whether it lies in excluding anyone suffering from an incapac-
itating health condition. With respect to family responsibilities, the 
question is how expanding the law’s meager accommodations for preg-
nant mothers to expectant fathers might have any significant effect on 
the distribution of carework between parents. 
A. Medical Conditions 
Unsexing Pregnancy describes a number of ways that pregnancy can 
affect the health of the nonpregnant parent, such as couvade syndrome, 
in which “pregnancy symptoms such as nausea, weight gain, mood swings 
and bloating occur in men,” and antenatal depression, which may occur 
in ten percent of expectant fathers.91 Under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), a pregnant person can take leave for “[a]ny period of 
incapacity due to pregnancy,” while a nonpregnant partner must have a 
“serious” health condition.92 Thus, a prospective father’s antenatal de-
pression would have to meet a higher bar than a mother’s for the father 
                                                                                                                           
 90. Light et al., supra note 39, at 1124 (noting that many transgender men surveyed 
about pregnancy “called for better treatment from the health care system through ac-
knowledging the unique identities of pregnant transgender men and grounding health 
care provider-patient interactions in compassion and respect”); see also Hoffkling et al., 
supra note 43, at 8; Obedin-Maliver & Makadon, supra note 39, at 6–7. 
 91. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 337 n.170 (quoting Katherine E. 
Wynne-Edwards, Why Do Some Men Experience Pregnancy Symptoms Such as Vomiting 
and Nausea when Their Wives Are Pregnant?, Sci. Am. (June 28, 2004), https:// 
www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-do-some-men-experienc [https://perma.cc/C7PX- 
FAAY]). 
 92. Id. at 337 & n.169 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (2018)). Additionally, some state 
laws require reasonable accommodations for conditions related to pregnancy, but not for 
nonpregnant parents. Id. at 339. 
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to qualify for leave. Fontana and Schoenbaum advocate “leveling up” to 
extend benefits to both parents, rather than “leveling down” to end ben-
efits for everyone.93 Accordingly, any expectant parent incapacitated by 
antenatal depression should be permitted leave. 
This example raises questions, however, about why those health 
conditions that affect expectant parents should be treated with excep-
tional solicitude by employment law. There are many types of incapac-
itating depression that are not antenatal. Consider a worker who suffers 
from incapacitating depression because they are caring for an older child 
with a serious illness. What message does the law send if it reserves the 
most favorable treatment only for those health conditions related to 
unborn children? Or what if the employee with depression is caring for 
an elderly parent with dementia?94 Why should an expectant couple ben-
efit from a more lenient standard? The disparate impact of childcare on 
women cannot be the answer, as the majority of unpaid eldercare provid-
ers are women.95 To go further, why does the workplace fail to offer sick 
leaves or accommodations for any “incapacity” that results from mental 
illness, whether connected to caregiving or not? What principle justifies 
drawing a line at pregnancy?96 The purpose of this Response is not to 
offer an argument about where the line should be drawn, but rather, to 
point out that there are important questions about why accommodations 
for medical conditions should be limited to expectant parents. 
B. Family Responsibilities 
Fontana and Schoenbaum’s main focus is not the medical conditions 
that accompany pregnancy; rather, it’s the family responsibilities. They 
are concerned that the carework associated with pregnancy is only accom-
modated or remunerated if taken on by the pregnant parent. One value 
                                                                                                                           
 93. See supra note 11. 
 94. See, e.g., Martin Pinquart & Silvia Sörensen, Differences Between Caregivers and 
Noncaregivers in Psychological Health and Physical Health: A Meta-Analysis, 18 Psychol. & 
Aging 250, 250 (2003) (discussing studies showing that caregivers, particular those caring 
for a person with dementia, report more negative mental and physical health). 
 95. See, e.g., AARP & Nat’l All. for Caregiving, Caregiving in the U.S. 17 (2015) 
(surveying 1,248 unpaid caregivers, and finding that sixty-six percent of caregivers for 
adults over fifty were women); Liz O’Donnell, The Crisis Facing America’s Working 
Daughters, Atlantic (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/ 
02/working-daughters-eldercare/459249/ [https://perma.cc/Y2JR-884U]. 
 96. The principle might be related to what Katherine Franke has called 
“repronormativity”: the view that childbearing should be “incentivized and subsidized” 
rather than other socially valuable forms of caregiving or cultural production. Katherine 
M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 
181, 184 (2001). There are reasons to be skeptical of repronormative policy justifications. 
For example, the argument that the United States must encourage births to replace its 
population overlooks the fact that this end can be achieved through immigration policy. 
Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, 
Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
1753, 1773–74 (2001). 
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of the article is that it offers a lengthy catalogue of all the types of care-
work that go into pregnancy, especially for first-time parents, from pur-
chasing diapers, to learning how to care for a newborn, to finding a 
pediatrician.97 This is a useful project in itself, because these forms of 
work—most often done by women—are too infrequently accounted for. 
But there is a striking mismatch between the length of the to-do list for 
expectant parents and the set of legal rules that might support them. The 
default position of U.S. law is that the costs of all carework are properly 
borne by the private family, rather than by employers or the public.98 It is 
therefore unlikely that expanding the few exceptional legal rules that sup-
port pregnancy to fathers will have significant effects on parental behavior. 
Pregnant women on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder 
are more likely to experience adverse employment consequences as a 
result of pregnancy.99 It is for these workers that existing legal protections 
for pregnancy are the least useful. Unsexing Pregnancy points out that the 
FMLA provides only mothers with leave for prenatal care, even though 
that category of care could include work fathers might do too, such as 
“attending appointments” and “obtaining essential knowledge about 
how to care for a newborn.”100 But the FMLA provides only a total of 
twelve weeks of leave per year to any one employee, for any covered pur-
pose, whether prenatal or postnatal, and whether related to the birth of a 
child or not.101 And that leave is unpaid, meaning it can only be taken by 
a worker who can afford to lose the income.102 A couple may calculate 
they can only afford to lose one income, not two.103 Even if the pregnant 
person’s presence is not required for prenatal care activities, a couple 
                                                                                                                           
 97. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 327–30 (describing these forms of 
carework as investments in physical, human, and social capital). 
 98. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual 
Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 1 (1995) (critiquing the privatization of 
dependency). 
 99. Jennifer Bennett Shinall, The Pregnancy Penalty, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 749, 817 
(2018) (“Regardless of how disadvantaged status is defined—through educational level or 
household income level—pregnant women in the labor market who fall on the low end of 
the distribution face employment gaps that are many times higher than pregnant women 
with advantaged socioeconomic status.”). 
 100. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 336 (discussing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.120(a)(4) (2018)). 
 101. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012). This is just one of the many limitations of the 
FMLA. Additionally, the FMLA does not apply to employers with fewer than fifty 
employees. Id. § 2611(4)(A). It does not apply unless the employee has been with the 
employer for at least one year and has worked at least 1250 hours in the year prior to the 
leave. Id. § 2611(2)(A). By one estimate, forty percent of the workforce is outside the 
FMLA’s coverage. Joan C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and 
Class Matter 8 (2010). 
 102. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c). Some states and localities require paid leave, but these laws 
“remain rare.” Shinall, supra note 99, at 809–10. 
 103. See, e.g., Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 
28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 45–46 (2007). 
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may calculate that the woman should take the leave because male part-
ners tend to earn more.104 And even in those places where paid leave is 
available, many workers do not take it because of fear of retaliation from 
their employers.105 
Expanding the law to fathers in elite jobs is unlikely to have much 
effect either. Elite jobs often give workers flexibility in scheduling as a 
perk, so these workers do not need to invoke the FMLA if they wish to take 
a break to engage in prenatal carework.106 Another example from Unsexing 
Pregnancy—allowable expenditures under Flexible Spending Accounts 
for childbirth, breastfeeding, or strength-training courses for pregnant 
persons but not for their partners107—is only likely to assist individuals in 
high tax brackets who likely could have afforded those expenses with 
their post-tax dollars anyway.108 
Moreover, empirical research gives reasons to be skeptical about 
whether expanding the meager protections offered to pregnant mothers 
will motivate prospective fathers to engage in more prebirth carework. 
Even when gender-neutral parental leaves are available, men do not take 
full advantage of them, for reasons that include social stigma and finan-
cial pressures.109 Extending job-protected FMLA leave to expectant fathers 
attending prenatal doctors’ appointments will not break down the social 
stigmas or practical calculations that cause fathers to engage in less 
carework.110 Experience with paid leave programs internationally and in 
                                                                                                                           
 104. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 15 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 17, 38 (2004) (“[T]o the extent 
available parental leave is unpaid, there exists a clear incentive for a couple to prefer 
maternal leave over paternal leave, given the likelihood that a husband out-earns his 
wife.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Eileen Appelbaum & Ruth Milkman, Leaves that Pay: Employer and 
Worker Experiences with Paid Family Leave in California 28 tbl.8 (2011), http://cepr.net 
/documents/publications/paid-family-leave-1-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGG8-MC9W]; 
Catherine Albiston & Lindsey Trimble O’Connor, Just Leave, 39 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1, 
39–40 (2016) (surveying workers about their reasons for not taking advantage of 
California’s paid family leave). 
 106. Albiston & O’Connor, supra note 105, at 62. 
 107. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 341 & n.194. 
 108. Leigh Osofsky, Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax 
Law Design, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 1057, 1109 (2013) (“Researchers have found that highly 
educated and high income taxpayers are the primary users of flexible spending accounts 
and that being in a higher marginal tax bracket is strongly associated with increased 
participation in flexible spending accounts.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Albiston & O’Connor, supra note 105, at 40–45; Shinall, supra note 99, 
at 826–27. 
 110. The FMLA allows a nonpregnant spouse to take leave only if that leave is “needed 
to care” for their pregnant spouse. 29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(5) (2019). Whether a father 
who was fired for attending a prenatal appointment might have a winning sex 
discrimination claim would depend on the circumstances. Compare Joan C. Williams & 
Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination 
and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1311, 
1320–21 (2008) (discussing sex discrimination cases in which men successfully prevail 
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U.S. states suggests that the way to reduce gender disparities with family 
leave law is to offer high rates of wage replacement and provide “use it or 
lose it” leave to each parent: “For example, if the mother alone takes 
family leave, the family might only get four weeks of paid leave, but that 
time would double if the father also takes leave.”111 
Unsexing Pregnancy does not make the claim that equal protection 
challenges to existing pregnancy protections that exclude expectant 
fathers will cause significant shifts in behavior; it emphasizes instead the 
“powerful messages” that the law can send in promoting carework by 
fathers during pregnancy.112 By this the authors mean the law could make 
the idea that fathers should participate in pregnancy less “off-the-wall.”113 
The idea of unsexing pregnancy for couples may have more promise as a 
public policy idea or social movement concept than as a litigation strat-
egy. In terms of public policy, the ideas advanced in Unsexing Pregnancy 
might inform new legislation that provides more generous workplace 
protections for pregnancy.114 In terms of social movements, the article 
might inform how prospective parents consider dividing up their work 
during pregnancy, and how progressive employers decide whether to 
accommodate them. 
But to achieve these impacts, the idea might need some rebranding. 
For one thing, “unsexing” is an unlikely slogan for a social movement.115 
The term requires translation to make sense to a popular audience.116 
                                                                                                                           
based on arguments that their employers applied gender stereotypes in penalizing them 
for engaging in carework), with Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 340 (pointing 
out that an employer might argue it was not engaged in sex discrimination in treating 
expectant mothers and fathers differently because it was only required to accommodate 
expectant mothers under the FMLA). 
 111. Shinall, supra note 99, at 828. 
 112. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 347. 
 113. See id. at 346. 
 114. For example, the proposed FAMILY Act, a federal law that would provide paid 
family and medical leave, borrows its definitions of “qualified caregiving” from the FMLA, 
rather than expanding those definitions in the way that the article would suggest. Family 
and Medical Insurance Leave Act, H.R. 1185, 116th Cong. § 3(6) (2019). 
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from Shakespeare, where it has a disturbing connotation: Lady MacBeth implored the 
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instinct.” Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All 713–14 (2005). Disparaging the 
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to take the nearest way to the throne—murder.” Id. at 714. 
Moreover, “sex” has the dual meaning of (1) pertaining to male–female and (2) 
pertaining to sexuality, and slippages between the two meanings are rampant. See Janet 
Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism 24 (2006). But see 
Rosenblum, supra note 18, at 83–84 (using the term “unsex” deliberately despite the 
slippage between the two understandings). 
 116. A Washington Post column on Fontana and Schoenbaum’s article put the term 
“unsex” in scare quotes and spent its first paragraphs explaining what the authors meant 
by it. Christine Emba, It’s Time to ‘Unsex’ Pregnancy, Wash. Post (Apr. 3, 2019), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/its-time-to-unsex-pregnancy/2019/04/03/5e876188-
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For another, the idea of the “pregnant couple” engenders biting re-
sistance from those concerned that heterosexual, cisgender men are 
appropriating the experience of pregnancy from their partners or draw-
ing false equivalences between their own experiences and pregnancy.117 
Many social conservatives have long cherished the idea of pregnancy as a 
special experience for women, and those who subscribe to traditional 
gender roles are unlikely to be enthusiastic about a project aimed at 
loosening them.118 On the left, millennials are particularly critical of 
appropriation by dominant groups of the experiences and identities of 
subordinate group members.119 Their concern is that reconceptualizing 
pregnancy as a two-person experience trivializes the impacts and risks of 
gestation and childbirth for the body of the person carrying the child 
and obscures the way that pregnancy has long been a justification for the 
oppression of women.120 Fontana and Schoenbaum are careful not to 
falsely equate the experiences of nonpregnant partners with those of 
pregnant ones; their project is to expose the carework involved in 
pregnancy and distribute it more fairly. Rather than unbounding the 
concept of pregnancy, this idea may have more political potential if 
characterized as recognizing that nonpregnant prospective parents can 
also experience the joys and travails of expecting a child. 
Thus, unsexing pregnancy for couples raises questions about wheth-
er pregnancy benefits should be conceptualized as related to health care 
needs or family responsibilities. If the FMLA should “level up” to cover 
incapacitating health conditions when they afflict either expectant 
parent, why not level up even more to cover incapacitating health condi-
                                                                                                                           
564e-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html?utm_term=.4e13a690b318 [https://perma.cc/2E8V- 
GSDU]. 
 117. Consider the following joke from a late-night talk show: 
Hello, I’m Mila Kunis with a very special message for all you soon-to-be 
fathers: Stop saying, “We’re pregnant.” You’re not pregnant. Do you 
have to squeeze a watermelon sized person out of your lady hole? No. 
Are you crying alone in your car listening to a stupid Bette Midler song? 
No. When you wake up and throw up is it because you’re nurturing a 
human life? No. It’s because you had too many shots of tequila. Do you 
know how many shots of tequila we had? None. Because we can’t have 
shots of tequila. We can’t have anything! Because we’ve got your little 
love goblin growing inside of us. 
Jimmy Kimmel Live, Mila Kunis Against Men Saying “We Are Pregnant,” YouTube (June 
10, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onDCvHtHSkY (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
 118. See, e.g., Emba, supra note 116 (“‘Unsexing Pregnancy’ is a phrase guaranteed to 
strike fear into the hearts of social conservatives everywhere. Yet—for now, at least—it 
doesn’t refer to robot wombs, a ban on gender reveal parties or Shulamith Firestone-esque 
radical feminist propositions.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Tracy Moore, Mila Kunis Is Right: Dudes, Stop Saying ‘We’re Pregnant,’ 
Jezebel (June 13, 2014), https://jezebel.com/mila-kunis-is-right-dudes-stop-saying-were-
pregnant-1590564625 [https://perma.cc/TNV3-9V5M]. 
 120. See id. 
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tions for all parents, all caregivers, or all workers? With respect to the 
distribution of carework in the family, the question is how constitutional 
litigation extending the meager set of existing pregnancy benefits to 
nonpregnant partners could change the incentives that cause pregnant 
people to take on the lion’s share of these responsibilities. It will take 
more than minor tweaks to the FMLA to unsex pregnancy for couples in 
a meaningful way. 
III. PREGNANT THREESOMES? 
A third sense in which the law might unsex pregnancy is for groups 
of three: couples seeking a surrogate or adoption arrangement.121 Fontana 
and Schoenbaum argue that laws that cover only “expectant mothers” 
have anomalous results with respect to various types of couples engaging 
a surrogate. These rules fail to cover “gay men who have engaged a 
surrogate,” since both men are expectant fathers, not mothers.122 But the 
term “expectant mother” might protect the woman in a man–woman 
couple that has engaged a surrogate, even though she herself is not preg-
nant.123 It might even cover both partners in a woman–woman couple, 
whether or not either one is pregnant.124 Fontana and Schoenbaum 
argue that these results offend the principle of Obergefell v. Hodges:125 that 
different- and same-sex parents should be treated equally.126 The only pos-
sible policy rationale for such anomalous results would be the association 
of women with carework.127 Moreover, if the term “expectant mother” 
means intended mother, it might not cover a surrogate or a pregnant 
person who plans to place the child for adoption. 
But what if workplace accommodation laws were neutral with respect 
to the gender identity of the pregnant individual, giving benefits to “ges-
tational parents” or “pregnant persons” rather than “expectant moth-
ers”? In that case, surrogates and pregnant individuals planning to place 
a child for adoption would be covered. However, no couple engaging a 
surrogate or seeking a child for adoption would be protected—whatever 
their sexual orientations or gender identities might be. Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                           
 121. It is also possible for single people to adopt or have a baby through a surrogate. 
Most of the issues discussed in this Part apply to these individuals as well. Surrogacy and 
adoption arrangements might unsex pregnancy in the sense of allowing people to become 
parents without coital reproduction. See Halley, supra note 115 (discussing the multiple 
meanings of the term “sex”). 
 122. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 338. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id.  
 125. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 126. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 350 (“The constitutional mandate to 
equalize different- and same-sex parents in the period after birth presumably extends in 
substantial part to the period before birth as well.”). 
 127. Id. (“This reinforces the constitutionally suspect stereotype that caring is 
women’s work . . . .”). 
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such rules would disadvantage couples consisting of two individuals who 
were both assigned male at birth, and are more likely to rely on surrogacy 
or adoption to become parents.128 Different types of prebirth carework 
are involved in surrogacy and adoption arrangements, including, but not 
limited to: research on the medical options and legal constraints, engag-
ing an agency, finding a clinic for in vitro fertilization, selecting an egg 
donor, establishing a relationship with the person who will be or is 
pregnant, negotiating legal agreements, and formalizing the adoption, 
among other things.129 
Extending workplace accommodation laws to these forms of care-
work raises unique questions. Adoptive parents “may take FMLA leave 
before the actual placement or adoption of a child if an absence from 
work is required for the placement for adoption or foster care to pro-
ceed.”130 Should the same accommodations be allowed for employees 
who seek to become parents by employing a surrogate?131 Why allow “ex-
pectant mothers,” but not any parent adopting a newborn to take leave 
for the purpose of “obtaining essential knowledge about how to care for 
a newborn?”132 
Other questions involve surrogates themselves. For example, should 
a person engaged in surrogacy for profit receive pregnancy accommoda-
tions from their employer?133 One court has suggested the answer is yes. 
In Gonzales v. Marriot International, an hourly hotel employee gave birth 
to an infant pursuant to a gestational surrogacy agreement and then 
began to take breaks to express breast milk, first for the infant’s family 
and later to donate to a milk bank.134 She alleged that after a few weeks, 
her employer told her she could no longer take lactation breaks because 
                                                                                                                           
 128. See Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 
1065, 1089–93. Any couple without at least one partner who can gestate a child would be 
disadvantaged. 
 129. For thoughtful first-person narratives about these processes for becoming a 
parent, see, for example, Dan Savage, The Kid: What Happened After My Boyfriend and I 
Decided to Go Get Pregnant (1999) (open adoption); Darren Rosenblum et al., Pregnant 
Man?: A Conversation, 22 Yale J.L. & Feminism 207, 208–17 (2010) (surrogacy). 
 130. 29 C.F.R. § 825.121(a)(1) (2019). It specifies: “For example, the employee may 
be required to attend counseling sessions, appear in court, consult with his or her attorney 
or the doctor(s) representing the birth parent, submit to a physical examination, or travel 
to another country to complete an adoption.” Id. Although the birth parents may incur 
similar costs, they are not included in the regulation. 
 131. This is a genuine question worthy of further consideration; this short Response 
does not take a position on whether workplace leave policy should aim to incentivize 
adoption over surrogacy. 
 132. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 133. One Flexible Spending Account administrator—Cigna—has concluded that costs 
incurred by prospective parents with respect to fertility treatments for “non-dependent 
surrogates” are not covered expenses. Patricia Stapleton & Daniel Skinner, The Affordable 
Care Act and Assisted Reproductive Technology Use, 34 Pol. & Life Sci. 71, 80 (2015). 
 134. 142 F. Supp. 3d 961, 965–66 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
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she was not “feeding ‘a child at home.’”135 The employee argued this was in 
violation of California law, which requires employers to reasonably accom-
modate lactation.136 The court held: “[W]hether it is ‘reasonable’ to re-
quire an employer to accommodate an employee’s desire to express milk 
that she intends to donate or sell is a question of fact for the jury.”137 This 
holding left it to the jury to decide whether surrogacy is distinguishable 
from the sorts of side businesses or philanthropic activities that employ-
ers are not required to accommodate. It is difficult to see how the 
principle of sex equality answers that question.138 The rationale for 
accommodating surrogates might instead be to further the interests of 
the intended parents and the health and well-being of the future child. 
This points to another question: What would it mean to put adop-
tion and surrogacy arrangements on equal footing with more traditional 
methods of reproduction? According to one agency, the costs of surro-
gacy are between $90,000 and $130,000.139 Health insurers are only re-
quired to cover artificial reproductive technologies (ART) in fourteen 
states,140 and only for cases of “infertility”—a term generally defined with-
out LGBTQ couples in mind.141 Moreover, not all states allow surrogacy, 
and some restrict it to married or different-sex couples, meaning many 
prospective parents may have to travel to make surrogacy arrangements, 
which adds additional costs.142 Due to these costs, people with access to 
ART are affluent and “largely white.”143 Legal scholar Seema Mohapatra 
                                                                                                                           
 135. Id. at 966 (quoting Complaint at 7, Gonzales, 142 F. Supp. 3d 961 (No. 15-3301), 
2015 WL 3609313). 
 136. Id. at 974. 
 137. Id. 
 138. According to the Gonzales court, the fact that the plaintiff was not allowed 
lactation breaks, while other employees who were pumping breast milk to feed their own 
children were, could be a basis for a sex discrimination claim because the plaintiff was 
penalized for failing to conform with stereotypes about traditional motherhood. Id. at 983. 
 139. West Coast Surrogacy Costs & Fees, W. Coast Surrogacy, Inc., 
https://www.westcoastsurrogacy.com/surrogate-program-for-intended-parents/surrogate-
mother-cost [https://perma.cc/J6UM-FNVE] (last visited July 31, 2019). 
 140. State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, National 
Conference of St. Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurance-
coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/BLQ8-6H8Y] (last updated June 12, 
2018). Two additional states only require that insurers offer the coverage. Id. 
 141. See Seema Mohapatra, Assisted Reproduction Inequality and Marriage Equality, 
92 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 87, 98–99 (2017) (“[E]ven in those few states where insurance 
companies have to cover ART, the definitions of infertility often anticipate medical 
infertility—not infertility due to being in a same-sex relationship.”). 
 142. Id. at 99. 
 143. Aziza Ahmed, Race and Assisted Reproduction: Implications for Population 
Health, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 2801, 2806–07 (2018). Moreover, clinics tend to stock white 
donors and charge more for eggs from white donors, sending “[t]he social message . . . 
that the industry is primarily designed for white consumers.” Camille Gear Rich, 
Contracting Our Way to Inequality: Race, Reproductive Freedom and the Quest for the 
Perfect Child, Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 14–15) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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has argued that equality would require changes to these state laws, in-
creased insurance coverage, and efforts to reduce health care costs.144 
Adoption is also expensive: One U.S. government source estimates that 
an adoption with a private agency may cost $20,000 to $45,000,145 alt-
hough costs may be lower for black children.146 Americans who are not 
wealthy sometimes forgo adoption, or organize fundraisers in an effort to 
find the money.147 There are a number of obstacles to adoption that 
reflect “irrational mistrust” of adoptive parents, including “an ‘intrusive’ 
and often ‘demeaning’ screening process, endless paperwork and ‘red 
tape,’ and confusing regulations that vary from one jurisdiction to 
another—all of which can be expensive to navigate.”148 Legal scholar 
Michael Boucai has argued that leveling out these disadvantages would 
require “direct services to [potential adoptive parents], public education, 
government subsidies, and reform of the adoption process itself.”149 
My purpose in this short Response is not to take any position on 
whether employers or public policy should attempt to equalize the costs 
of coital reproduction, surrogacy, and adoption for prospective parents. 
In addition to LGBTQ equality, this question implicates difficult issues 
related to race, class, the best interests of children, and the rights of 
parents. My aim instead is to ask what it would mean to “unsex preg-
nancy” in the context of couples in which neither partner can become 
pregnant themself. In light of the many practical and financial barriers to 
adoption and surrogacy, litigation challenging sex classifications in preg-
nancy benefits is unlikely to offer much assistance to these prospective 
parents. 
IV. NETWORKED PREGNANCIES? 
Finally, rather than seeing pregnancy as the work of individuals, 
couples, or groups of three, the law might universalize the experience of 
pregnancy, seeing prebirth carework as requiring broad public support. 
This project might extend accommodations beyond the two-parent 
model to extended family members, friends, and public services that might 
assist pregnant individuals. It would require creative thinking about how 
                                                                                                                           
 144. Mohapatra, supra note 141, at 103–04. 
 145. Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Planning for Adoption: Knowing the Costs and 
Resources 3 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/s_costs.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/GN45-C3AC]. 
 146. See, e.g., Michele Bratcher Goodwin, Baby Markets, in Baby Markets: Money and 
the New Politics of Creating Families 6 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010). 
 147. See, e.g., Claire Swinarski, Why Is It So Expensive to Adopt a Child?, Wash. Post 
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2016/11/28/ 
why-is-it-so-expensive-to-adopt-a-child/?utm_term=.8bc37f91d06e [https://perma.cc/N8BU- 
89MA] (discussing GoFundMe pages, garage sales, karaoke nights, and foundations that 
provide grant money). 
 148. Boucai, supra note 128, at 1112 (footnotes omitted). 
 149. Id. at 1113 (footnotes omitted). 
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to restructure the provision of health care and workplaces to offer better 
work–family balance for all. 
Many pregnant people rely on networks of extended family and 
friends for support, rather than a parent partner.150 This may be particu-
larly true for families of color. Professor Melissa Murray explains that 
“[w]ithin the African-American community, for example, parents fre-
quently share caregiving responsibilities and material resources with 
community members in an arrangement known colloquially as ‘other-
mothering.’ In Latino communities, compadres—literally ‘co-parents’—
play a central role in the child’s spiritual upbringing and often are ex-
pected to share the parents’ caregiving responsibilities.”151 Yet workplace 
accommodation laws, like the FMLA, are “unrealistically focused on 
parenthood as the locus of caregiving.”152 
One example of a pregnancy benefit discussed throughout the 
Fontana and Schoenbaum article is smoking cessation programs, which 
insurers must cover for pregnant women under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA).153 The article argues that these programs should be extended 
from pregnant persons to fathers, because second-hand smoke is also 
harmful to a fetus.154 But what about pregnant people who live with 
family members other than an expectant father? If the reason for the 
smoking cessation program is the health of the fetus, then it would make 
sense to extend the program to anyone living in a household with a preg-
nant individual. Moreover, smoking is not just harmful to children; it is 
harmful to everyone. Thus, in 2014, the U.S. Departments of Health and 
Human Services, Labor, and Treasury issued a guidance clarifying that, 
under the ACA, private health insurance plans should cover tobacco 
cessation for everyone.155 
Another example from Unsexing Pregnancy is FMLA leave for 
prenatal health care appointments. Fontana and Schoenbaum point out 
that the FMLA is limited in that only the “spouse” of the pregnant em-
ployee may take prenatal leave, and only if necessary “to care for a 
pregnant spouse.”156 Unmarried expectant fathers may not take leave to 
                                                                                                                           
 150. See e.g., Murray, supra note 17, at 393 (“In families headed by single parents, 
extended family and friends may informally take on a substantial caregiving role.”); Laura 
A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 209 (2007) (explaining that 
some “people prefer to experience personal connection, and give and receive care, thr-
ough friendship rather than family”). 
 151. Murray, supra note 17, at 391–92 (footnotes omitted). 
 152. Id. at 408. 
 153. See Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 360. 
 154. Id. at 360–61. 
 155. Covering Tobacco Cessation as Preventive Service: Who Is Making the Decisions?, 
Am. Lung Ass’n, https://www.lung.org/assets/documents/tobacco/who-is-making-the-
desicions.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS66-XX4G] (last updated July 31, 2014). 
 156. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 338 (discussing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.120(a)(5) (2018)). This is by contrast to postpregnancy, where the FMLA defines 
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care for their pregnant partners. Fontana and Schoenbaum critique this 
provision “for denigrating the father’s role in pregnancy” and point out 
that “forty percent of births are to unmarried mothers.”157 But what this 
provision denigrates is the unmarried father, rather than fathers in 
general. Whether this marital-status distinction is justified is a different 
question than whether to unsex pregnancy.158 Moreover, extending 
FMLA leave during pregnancy from spouses to fathers would not help 
those pregnant persons who rely on networks for care rather than 
partners. Some scholars have suggested licensing and registration 
schemes that would permit parents to deputize family and friends as 
alternative caregivers in these circumstances, enabling those friends or 
family members to take FMLA-protected leave to assist pregnant 
individuals in need of support.159 For pregnant people without private 
support networks, public programs might reduce the burdens of preg-
nancy by making prenatal health care faster, more convenient, and less 
intrusive,160 and by directly providing necessary supplies when newborns 
leave the hospital.161 
The prenatal care example raises larger questions about why FMLA 
leave is needed for anyone to take a few hours off to attend a doctor’s 
appointment. U.S. workplaces—in which workers must often put in long 
and unpredictable hours—imagine the ideal worker as one with no care-
                                                                                                                           
parents broadly to include “those with day-to-day responsibilities to care for and financially 
support a child.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c), (d)(3). 
 157. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 338. 
 158. The law may presume that parents who are not married chose that arrangement 
precisely because they were not sure if they wished to provide care to one another or to 
coparent. Cf. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 Md. L. Rev. 55, 103 (2016) 
(“Even where disqualifying behavior such as domestic violence is not an issue, unmarried 
couples report that the instability in their lives that comes from insecure employment, 
unstable income, substance abuse, and involvement with the criminal justice system make 
them wary of the type of commitment marriage entails.”). 
 159. Laura Rosenbury has proposed a system that would permit individuals to assign 
certain benefits—such as those available under the FMLA—to a person who is not their 
spouse or partner. Rosenbury, supra note 150, at 230–31. Professor Murray has suggested 
“expanding the relationships contemplated by the FMLA—and other public and private 
benefit schemes—to include more than just the parent/child dyad.” Murray, supra note 
17, at 451–52 (proposing an administrative scheme that would provide licensing for 
nonparental caregivers, with the consent of a child’s legal parents). 
 160. See Khiara M. Bridges, Reproducing Race: An Ethnography of Pregnancy as a 
Site of Racialization 50–51, 58, 68 (2011) (describing how prenatal coverage under 
Medicaid often requires a pregnant patient to endure “hideously long waiting periods,” to 
“meet with [a] coterie of professionals,” and to “detail intensely personal and intimate 
facts about her life” all before receiving a medical exam, conditions patients with private 
insurance are not subjected to). 
 161. See, e.g., Tal Trachtman Alroy, New Jersey Gives Out Free Baby Boxes in Move to 
Lower Infant Mortality Rates, CNN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/26/ 
health/new-jersey-baby-boxes-safe-sleep/index.html [https://perma.cc/YDH3-ZYKQ] (“Babies 
born in New Jersey this year will go home with a sturdy, safe box to sleep in and additional 
newborn essentials–all for free.”). 
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taking responsibilities at all.162 An increasing number of low-wage jobs 
are temporary, contingent, and precarious, with unpredictable schedul-
ing in which shifts are announced at the last minute, making it difficult 
for workers to juggle caregiving commitments.163 Many workers lack ac-
cess to paid sick days or vacation.164 The type of flexibility that might 
allow a worker to take time off during the work day to attend a prenatal 
appointment without trouble is a perk of those jobs at the top end of the 
economy.165 
In light of these circumstances, undermining the gendered division 
of labor that begins with pregnancy will require more than making 
existing benefits gender neutral and more than even unsexing preg-
nancy; it will require thoroughgoing efforts to reform workplace struc-
tures and cultures.166 
CONCLUSION 
Unsexing Pregnancy asks important questions about why workplace 
accommodations law presumes that only expectant mothers experience 
pregnancy or engage in pregnancy-related carework. Removing refer-
ences to “mothers” and “women” from pregnancy rules is an urgent pro-
ject to ensure that pregnant people who do not identify as women have 
equal access to reproductive health care and workplace accommodations. 
It is also important to update workplace rules that unfairly assume men 
do not or should not engage in carework during pregnancy. The article’s 
insights prompt other important questions, such as whether public policy 
and workplace rules should treat coital reproduction, adoption, and sur-
rogacy arrangements differently; whether accommodations for medical 
                                                                                                                           
 162. See Albiston & O’Connor, supra note 105, at 7 (“[E]mployers continue to expect 
their workers to be as available and dedicated as the industrial-era male breadwinner with 
a stay-at-home wife, even when these employers no longer provide a family wage, secure 
employment, or even regular hours in return.”). 
 163. Id. at 2–4 (“The percentage of workers in the United States with variable 
schedules they do not control grew 74.2% between 1997 and 2004.”). 
 164. Id. at 4. 
 165. Id. at 62 (discussing how well-paid workers tend to receive discretionary 
accommodations more often than low-wage workers do). 
 166. Scholars have proposed a number of ideas. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 101, at 
1–2 (“To match today’s workplace to today’s workforce, we need both public supports 
(subsidized child care, parental leave financed at a national level, national health 
insurance) and workers’ rights (mandated vacation time, proportional pay for part-time 
work, and the right to request a flexible schedule).”); Albiston & O’Connor, supra note 
105, at 57–59 (proposing paid family leave and amendments to extend the coverage of the 
FMLA to all workers); Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 
104 Am. Econ. Rev. 1091, 1092 (2014) (arguing for changes to the labor market to reduce 
the incentives of firms “to disproportionately reward individuals who worked long hours 
and who worked particular hours”); Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a 
Reduced Workweek in the United States, in Precarious Work, Women, and the New 
Economy: The Challenge to Legal Norms 131, 133 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 
2006). 
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conditions that affect pregnant as well as nonpregnant people should be 
extended to all expectant parents, all caregivers, or all people with the 
condition; how to restructure the workplace to be more humane for 
pregnant workers who rely on networks of friends and family for care and 
support; how to craft public policy solutions to support pregnant workers 
who lack private support networks; and how to reimagine the labor mar-
ket in an era in which most families are no longer anchored by a female 
caretaker and male breadwinner. Unsexing pregnancy in a substantive 
sense will require more than revisions to existing rules to reflect gender 
neutrality; it will require new approaches that are attentive to the many 
differences among pregnant people and American families. 
 
